INTRODUCTION
Externalities have played an important role in the public economic literature. For example, roads, public transportation, recreatiorr, and cultural facilities are visited, and therefore crowded by residents in nearby jurisdictions. Crirne fighting in one jurisdiction could either lower regional crime or push criminals into neighboring communities. Air pollution controls and sewage treatment enhance the environment quality of borderingjurisdictions. Radio and TV broadcasts can be seen away from the local border. Educational and job training expenditures may translate in productivity gains in workplaces outside the communify.
In the case of the efficiency of local public goods provision, benefit spillovers or inter-jurisdictional externalitiesarea widespread feature of many services provided by local govemments (Wilson, 1986 (Wilson, , 1999 .
The significance of spillovers is widely recognized in the fiscal federalism literature (see: for example Oates, 1972; . The general conclusion of this strand of literature is that externalities tent to cause a Vol. 5. No. I divergence between private and social costs and benefits, and thus lead to suboptimal decision-making. Some authors have also worried about the equity consequences of spillovers (see, e.g., Ladd and Yinger, 1994) , but also relating to the design of'needs-based' equalization grants (Bramley, 1 990). The general policy prescribed to deal with them is to delegate the authority of decision making to the lower layer ofgovemments.
Indonesia provides a unique opportunity to exam i ne the nature of inter-j uri sd ictional externalities within a country consisting of central, provincial, and local levels of government. Since her independence in 1945, the administration ofthe country's regional public services operated through a hierarchical and parallel system of de-concentrated central government agencies and ostensibly autonomous subnational governrnents. Throughout most of its history Indonesia's system ofregional government administration has been among the most centralized in the world (see for example Davey, 1989) Abstract: Spatial interaction among local governments in fiscal setting decisions is receiving increasingly attention in the applied public economics literature. Spatial interaction models rely on the presence ofan externality from local budgetmaking, that is external effects originate from inter-jurisdictional resource flows due to tax competition for a mobile base, or from local public expenditure spillovers into neighboring jurisdictions. Similarly, the intergovernmental grants competition exists when there is a rivalry among local governments to get them from central government. This paper attempted to identify how great the fiscal competition among local governments in Indonesia. Using spatial statistics, we concluded that the fiscal competition among municipalities was greater compared to the pre fiscal decentralization period. It seems that the local tax setting and expenditures decisions in particular municipality can be attributed to the mimicking behavior to neighbor regions. Also, we found that the fiscal competition among municipalities could be attributed negatively to the fiscal disparity. Those imply that in the regional autonomy era the local governments tend to increase their local own revenue intensively and demand for intergovernmental grants in order to finance their expenditures. In the long run, they could lead to the high cost economy, worsening fiscal dependency, and inefficiency of local government expenditures. Those findings above suggest that the distribution of intergovernmental transfers among regions should consider the local tax efforl and the services minimum standard plays an important role to achieve the efficiency oflocal government expenditures.
Keyrvords: Fiscal competition, local govemment, decentralization, public expenditure, municipalities by the tax transfer system and equalization payments, whether a particular local government engages a strategic interaction with anotlier local governments in the surrounding areas is a political and economic issue.
Strategic interaction in setting local taxes and expenditures are two forms of tlie fiscalcompetition among local governments beside intergovernmental grants competition. Basically, tax setting and expenditure policies in a region might affect to other regions policies. The root problem of those phenomena is the existence of spatial correlatiott among local governments. In the broader sense, inter-jurisdictional competiti-on can be defined as rivalry among govemments in which each government is tryingto win some scarce beneficial resource or in wh ich each government seek to avoid a particular cost (Kenyon, 1997) .
In developed countries, a number of empirical studies concerning the issue have been conducted (see for example: Gordon, l9B3: Wildasin, 1986; Salmon, 1 987; Case et al., 1 993 ; Kelej ian and Robinson, 1993; Besley and Case, 1995; Brueckner, 1998; Heyrdels and Vuchelen, 1998; Figlio, et al., 1999; and Bivand and Szymanski, 1997; . Unfortunately, they tested the fiscal competition parlially focusing on either tax or expenditr-rre aspects. In contrast, the similar studies focusing on similar issue in developing countries are rarely.
Some studies in Indonesia have been generally concentrated to the fiscal imbalance between central and local governments (see for example: Uppal and Suparmoko, 1986; Bawazier, 1988; Akhmad, 1990; Kuncoro, 1995; Indonesia Forum, 2000 , Sidik, 2001 . In a quite similar spirit, our approacli has three significant differences. First, we employ spatial statistics method to identify the fiscal interdependency includingta4 expenditures, and subsidies among municipalities in a comprehensive way. Second, instead of using a single fiscal regime, we compare the fiscal interdependency among local governments in preand post-decentralization periods. Finally, we identiS' the relationship between fiscal inter-dependency and fiscal equity (disparity) across local governments.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 briefly summarized the existing literature while Section 3 highlighted the previous results. The methodology is described in the next section and to report the main empirical results followed. Finally, some concludins remarks are drawn.
MBTHODS
The earliest idea of inter-jurisdiction competition (lJC) was delivered by Tiebout (1956) . The key actors in his rnodel are individuals (consumer-voters) who decided which (of many) local governments to locate in, based on their needs for government services and the public service/tax packages offered by the various governments. Tiebout assumes that individuals have complete knowledge of the various government revenue and expenditure packages; that individuals free to choose among a large number of communities; and that individuals are fully mobile. Furthermore, he assumes that there is no intercommunity spillover effects occured and that each community is able to attain its optimal amount at which the average cost of production on particular package of pLrblic services is minimized.
To the extent on Tiebout's rather restrictive conditions are met, goods and services provided by suburban local governments will exhibit both locative efficiency and productive efficiency. In Tiebout's model, local taxes are benefit taxes, proportional to the benefits from government services received by households, rather than taxes based on ability to pay. No redistribution of income takes place in his system of local governments. The Tiebout's model can be criticized for its restrictive assumptions. A crucial shortcorning of liis model is that it does not include business firms, so that it is not particularly helpful in illuminating the phenomenon of IJC for economic development.
The Oates-Schwab model ( l99l ) focuses on the mobility of capital rather than households. They assume that the local government's objective is to maximize the welfare of its constituents, subject to the applicable budget constraints. They also assume that no beneficial or negative spillovers occurred and that a sufficient number of local governments exist to approximate a competitive market. Furthermore, they assume that communities have complete information about the wage benefits provided by the location of business firms in their communities and those firms can correctly evaluate the tax and expenditure packages offered by the various communities. An implicit assumption in their model is that economic development efforts by local governments are costless.
The major result of the Oates-Schwab model is that taxes on both households and business firms become taxes beneficial. In the case of business firms, communities neither subsidize them to locate in their communities, nor tax them in excess of the costs of public services provided to them. Instead firms pay exactly the cost of the public services to them. In this benefittax equilibrium, communities will have no incentive to further increase subsidies to businesses. If communities were supposed to do so, the cost in terms of forgone tax revenues or higher public service costs would exceed any benefits in the forrn of increased jobs or income. Like the Tiebor.rt model, the Oates-Schwab model is devoid of redistribution by local governments. No ability{o-pay taxes are levied only benefit taxes. Inter-jurisdiction competition may not be equitable in the OatesSchwab world but it is productively and electively efficient.
McGuire ( l99l ) has built an irrformal model of IJC, which she labels "destructive competition" that has less happy consequences. She assumes that individuals have preferences for redistribution and thus choose revenue systems that rely on ability-topay taxes. McGuire fufther assumes that tlre natior.r's population is heterogeneous in terms of income and mobility. An optimal level of public services and taxes can be computed, one that conceivably coLrld be attained in the case of zero rnobility of individuals or businesses.
However, it will never be attained. Any single jurisdiction will have an incentive to cut tax for relatively wealthy and rnobile individLrals or businesses in orderto lure them to relocate. Thejurisdiction would hope to be able to use the revenue gairred from tlie incoming wealthy to cut taxes for current residents or to increase public seruices. The problem is that all jurisdictions will have the same incentive to cut tax for the wealthy and rnobile.
McGuire concludes tlrat locative efficiency cannot be achieved in the case of destructive competition. She argues that household mobility will ensure that productive efficiency will be attained, however, as jurisdictions seek to maximize their attractiveness by minimizing the burden of their taxes for given level of public seryices. In McGuire's model, both horizontal and vertical inequities result from IJC. Less mobile individuals will encumber a higher tax burdens than their more mobile counterpafis. Vertical inequities will also result, as high-income taxpayers benefit from selective tax relief.
Wolkoff( 1992) asks whether a formal model of economic development programs can explain the existence of some seemingly irrational public policies. In his mind, jurisdictions use economic development subsidies to try to induce potentially mobile firms to stay in the community. Firms are of two types: those that are potentially mobile and tlrose that are not. A central problern in Wolkoff's model is that the jurisdiction cannot easily distinguish between these two fpes of finns. Both the firrns and the jurisdictions engage in strategic behavior. The community decides on the amount of the subsidy and the probability that it will give a sLrbsidy when a finn requesting one.
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The firm decides on the amount of subsidy requested. Wolkoff assumes that the community chooses the amount of subsidy and probability of granting a subsidy in order to maximize the expected value of its action.
Wolkoff's model explains two types of seeming irrationalities in existing economic development programs. Assuming that all finns request the same subsidy, whether they are potentially rnobile or not. The community then has no way of distinguishing between the two types of firms. It turns out that the most advantageous strategy for tlie community is to offer modest subsidies to all firms. The inevitable result is that some firrns with no relocation potential will also receive the subsidy. It seems like a waste of funds from the perspective ofcommunity with rational maximizing behavior.
An alternative scenario outlined by Wolkoff is based on a cornmunity's effoft to separate potentially mobile from immobile firms. To do this, the community makes subsidy awards become uncertain. Immobile firms then reduce the amount of their subsidy requests. The community ends up avoiding large subsidies to firrns that have no possibilitr, of relocating. However, at the same time, the community rejects the requests of, and thereby loses, some mobile firms. In isolation, the fact of providing insufficient economic development subsidies to certain mobile firms appears irrational. Wolkoff's pointed out that lve cannot look at such phenomena in isolation.
From Besley and Case ( 1995) , the exit optirnum is less irnporlant; it did not describe explicitly in their model, but its existence acknowledged. Instead, vote is a key to the accountability of elected officials. Imperfect information is also crucial to the BesleyCase model. Politicians more aware about the cost of providing public services than voters, and voters used the information about tax change in neighboring jr-rrisdictions to evaluate the performance of their incumbents. Politicians corne in two types: good politicians rvho do no rent-seeking and bad politicians who do rent-seeking. Politicians use strategic behavior in their tax-setting in order to influence voters' opinion regarding whether they are good or bad politicians. Voters will not reelect the incumbents whom they j udge by their tax changes, relative to the tax changes of neighboring jurisdictions, are considered bad pol iticiarrs.
The Besley-Case model is tikely most applicable to interstate competition because the smaller numbers of states rnake the strategic behavior of state politicians are easier to monitor. This rnodel also could apply to suburbs in metropolitan area if only the number of competing suburbs were not too many.
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The Besley-Case model does not illuminate the impl ication s of IJC phenomenon for economic development. Their decision to minimize the impoftance of interstate mobility rnay irnply to an impression that state officials are oversensitive of threats from highincome taxpayers or business to exit. Breton (1996) formulates a general theory of competitive governments. His model ofpLrblic finance and politics encompasses a wide range of competitive situations: cornpetition for the support of the govemed within governments, competition between govemments and othersocial institutions, competition between governments at different levels (for example, between states and local governments), and competition that is the subject of this paper-competition between governments at the same level, or IJC. He assumes that individuals seek to maximize utility and govemments seek to maximize expected consent.
In his treatment of IJC, he includes both implicit competition (Tiebout mechanism) and yardstick competition. Both are generally present iri IJC, but in a pure Tiebout world, Breton corectly notes, yardstick competition cannot exist. If the Tiebout rnodel operated perfectly, the population would sorl itself by preference for publicly provided goods until each community was homogenous and different from every other community. Tl-ren, individuals could not use the performance of neighboring governments to judge the performance of their own governments; governments would be too much different from each other in terms of their public service/tax packages.
That a jurisdiction's policy may be influenced by otherjurisdiction's policies has been recognized by several authors (Hettich and Winer, 1984; Salmon, 1987) . Still, it has not empirically reached the status of general acceptance. The conventional approach to modeling taxing and spending decisions consist of explaining tlre level of composition of revenues and expenditures by economic, political, and sociological characteristics of the jurisdiction itself(for suryey, see: Inman, 1988). However, a casual look at daily politics suggests that voters and politicians are case sensitive to events outside their geographical boLrndaries.
Three models have been offered in the local public finance literatr.rre to justify the existence of spatial interaction among local govemments. and have been tested intensively on local government data in recent years.
The first one is tlie traditional 'spill-over' or 'externality' model, which expenditure on local public services in ajurisdiction can liave beneficial or harmful effects onto residents in nearby jurisdictions (Gordon, 1983) . As an example is local expenditure on police services. Using US countl, data, Kelejian and Robinson ( 1993) found that police expenditures in a given county are significantly and positively influenced by neighboring county police expenditures. Since counties inflict a negative externality on their neighbors by spending more on police services due to cross-over between the borders, the need for police services in a given county tends to increase due to increasing of services in neighboring counties.
Second, spatial interaction among local jurisdictions in the form oftax competition arises when public spending was fund through tax on mobile capital by local governments (Wildasin, 1986) . Since the level of the tax base in a jurisdiction depends both, on own and otherjurisdiction' tax rates, strategic interaction results. Brueckner ( 1 998) found evidence of policy interdependence in the adoption of growth control measures among California cities. By restricting the amount of developable land, a city government increase land rent both in its own and in nearby cities, thereby generating an externality and strategic interaction in growth control decisions. By using a panel data set of the US states, Figlio et al. (1999) found that decentralized welfare benefit setting deteriorates interstate competition and might induce states to respond asymmetrically to the changes in their neighbors' policies.
Finally, a recent justification for the existence of interaction at the local level is the political agencythat is yardstick competition model. In such model, the imperfectly informed voters in a localjurisdiction use other governrnents' performance as a yardstick to evaluate their orvn government (Salmon, 1987) . Politicians are therefore sensitive to their local tax performance relative to similarly situated states. Then they try not to get too far out of line with policies in those jurisdictions (Oates, 1988) . The result is local authorities imitating each other's behavior.
Recently, the extent to which geographic proximity or either similari|l criteria matteq although is also an empirical question that has attracted some interest by applied economists. Case et al. (1993) estirnated a public expenditure equation using a panel data set of the US states' budget over the period of 1970-85. While they can reject the hypothesis of expenditure spillovers among geographical neighbors, they found a strong ernpirical evidence to support the mimicking hypothesis: state expenditures are similar in terms of demographic composition.
Besley and Case (1995) presented a political agency model where voters and politicians are case sensitive to events outside their boundaries and tested their yardstick competition hypothesis on US states' income taxes from 1960 to 1988. They found that geographic neighbor'tax changes have a positive and significant effect on a given state's tax changed. Heyndels and Vuchelen ( 1998) tested the tax imitation hypothesis at the level of Belgian municipalities and found strong positive spatial correlation in local income tax rates between neighboring authorities. Bivand and Szymanski ( 1 997; showed that there was spatial dependence in the cost of domestic garbage collection in the UK districts due to contracts based on the performance comparison and that spatial interaction were substantially reduced after the introduction of CCT (Compulsive Competitive Tendering), that imposed standard contracting rules and reduced the scope for local authorities to pursue idiosyncratic policies. Murillo (2003) tested for strategic interaction among US states in the detemination oftax rates on capital income. He found that states have a positively sloped reaction function to the tax policies of rival states when tax rates are chosen simultaneously.
To sum up, those various studies suggest that geograph ical proxim ity defi n ite ly matters to analy ze fiscal interdependence amongregions. In line with those studies, we will try to apply their approaches to analyze the fiscal competition in Indonesia and try to provide a deeper explanation. Furthermore, it could stimulate other researchers to re-estimate by using more sophisticated devices. Final objective is that the figure of local government budget will be more comprehensive for policy makers to address the related issues.
There are many indices to describe how great the inequality is, One of them is Entrophy Index developed by Theil in 1967. The most significant characteristic ofthe Entrophy Index is that the index can distinguish between-and within-region inequality.
In the context of regional (fiscal) disparity in Indonesia, it could be formulated as follows (Kuncoro. 2002:89) :
where ETI(y) is the overall spatial disparity Entrophy Index for per capita regional income (or fiscal variables), y, is the share of municipality income (fiscal) in province i on the total per capita real income (fiscal) in Indonesia, and N is the number of total municipality in Indonesia.
Furthermore, a standard empirical model of local public finance determination is usually expressed, in a linear specification, as:
where y is a vector of public finance variables of N local governments, X is a (NxK) matrix of explanatory variables, 2 is vector of parameters to be estimate, and p is an error term that is assumed to Business and Entrepreneurial Review be identically and independently distributed across the observations.
To formally test the presence of spatial autocorrelation due to spatial lag or eror dependence, it's necessary to perform several specification tests. The literature on spatialeconometric testing is widely and has suggested several ways for identifoing these effects (see, for example : Anselin, 1988) . The first specification test proposed is the Moran (1950) I's test. The Moran's I statistic for testing the null hypothesis that there are no spatial effects.
In general, spatial autocorrelation takes the form as follows: e, : lWe, * n,,
where e , is mean difference of a given variable, let say X,, from mean value in the corresponding group in the period t. The component of e, could be also the residual generated from the regiession model, The form of I represents the coefficient of autocorrelation, W is aweight given to geographically nearer regions, and n is the new disturbance terms.
The statistical test of spatial autocorrelation could be done in the following steps. (see:Anselin,lg99). The first step is to construct a (NxN) matrix linking all regions based on the location. Second, put 0 (null) in the main diagonal ofthe matrix connecting the same region. Third, put 1 (one) in the matrix when the two regions have a border. Forth, each element in the matrix is then normalized so that sum of total is 1 (one). Fifth, the sum of the row is used as weisht where W is a row-standardized weights matrix, N is the number of observations, K is the number of independent variables, and M: I -X(X'X)-1X,.
Mathernatically, Moran's I statistics lies between -I and 1 (-I < MI < I ). As indicator, the value of the Moran's I statistics closes to +l shows that the stronger the spatial positive autocorrelation, in the sense that the obseruation values tend to close to each other in the corresponding location. On the contrary the value of Moran's I statistics close to * I indicates negative spatial autocorelation, in the sense that the observation values do not tend to close to each other in the corresponding location. Meanwhile, the val ue of Moran's I statistics close to zero presenting that the observation values are randomly distributed (independent) among regions.
In theory, the mean value of the Moran,s I statistics ir E,ru, = -I /(n-I ) and tl.re standard deviation is SDlr,rr; : (2lh,h, Wu)"'. The test of significance Moran's I statistics is done by comparing between the Ml-calculated and E,r,.,:
It will be normally distributed (distribution Zstatistics). The significance of Moran's I statistics give a signal that spatial effect plays an important role in the subsequent analysis.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Before presenting the results, a word about datais in order. Data on actual municipal Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita without oil and gas in refere to constant price of 1 993 published by Central Bureau of Statistics were used to test the existence of polarization among Indonesian municipalities. Data of fiscal performance from the same sources are taken from Regional Financial Statistics. All variables were transformed into actual per capita term.
The samples period of 1988-2003 covered 80 percent of total municipalities, were divided into 2 sub -periods, 1988-2001 and200l-2003 , in effortsto provide more complete picture about the dynamics of relative income and fiscal distributions before and after fiscal decentralization. Separating this period is also required by Chow test. Table 1 configures the complete definition of all economic variables, which willbe used in this study. s) Table 2 shows Theil's Entrophy index of the selected fiscal variables and income per capita during last l6 years. In general, all of indices cousistently increase. Looking merely at the magnitude, the Theil Entrophy index of percapita regional income (Y) was the greatest. In contrast, the Theil Entrophy indices for revenue sharing (RS) and LOR were the lowest. It indicates that RS andLORwererelatively distributed equally; in comparison with the disparity of percapita regional income which was distributed unequally. The absence of spatial effect on LOR collection would be a materialization of fiscal centralization policy which had been implemented previously. The Z-value in the corresponding periods was less than Z-table value in 95 percent level of confidence. In those periods, objects, items, and tariffs in LOR had been decided by central government and equally implemented for all local governments.
In accordance with fiscal decentralization era since 2001, the spatial effects would have been significant. It was confirmed by Cliow test using 2001 as breaking year.
Those phenomena indicate that the surrounding areas influen ce realization of the LOR collection. It seems that realization of the LOR collection in a particular local government would became a reference for others to determine realization of the LOR collection in the next period. In tlre long run, it would induce local tax competition among local governments altd in turn stimulate the high cost economy (Saad, 2003) .
Further, lve discovered that there was a close relationship between unequal econotnic variables CONCLUSION By using panel data on the Indonesian local government, this paper has explored the source of spatialauto-correlation in local pLrblic finance. The results ofthe analysis found that the fiscal competition among municipalities were greater compared to the distribution and their spatial correlations, as described in figure 1. It is notable that in general the increase in LOR unequal distribution associates with the increase in LOR interdependence among regions. Second, the increase of local government expenditures in total were un-equally supported by transfers associate with the decrease in their interdependences among regions. This condition was strengthening especially after 1 998" Third, the increase in regional income disparity correlates to its interdependence in the opposite direction. Howeveq after regional autonomy era, this correlation changed to parallel direction. Those indicate that fiscal equalization in regional autonomy and fiscal ciecentral ization era requires a decl ining of the degree of fi scal interdependence amon gmun icipal ities. On the contrary the regional income equalization using localgovemment expend itures i nstrument, induced by intergovernmental transfers, requires an increasing ofthe degree of fi scal interdependence among municipalities.
pre-fi scal decentralization period.
It seems that the local tax setting and local government expenditures decisions in a particular municipality were mimicking on the behavior of neighbor regions. Fufihermore, the spatial interaction is negatively correlated to the fiscaldisparity. Those imply tliat in the regional autonomy era, the local 
